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Inequality of educational opportunity and
time-varying circumstances:
Longitudinal evidence from Peru
José María Rentería∗
Abstract
This document provides for the first time in the literature both lower and
upper bounds estimates of inequality of opportunity on learning achievement
in Peru. It exploits an unusual and rich longitudinal data set on a cohort of
children who have been followed for fifteen years almost since they were born.
This feature allows for studying empirically the role of time-varying circum-
stances, a problem that has been neglected until present in the inequality of
opportunity literature. In this context, the sensitivity of the upper bound
methodology proposed by Niehues and Peichl (2014) is evaluated.
Keywords: Inequality of opportunity, learning achievement
JEL classification: D63, I24
Résumé
Ce document fournit, pour la première fois dans la littérature, des estima-
tions des limites inférieures et supérieures de l’inégalité des opportunités en
matière des acquis scolaires au Pérou. Il exploite un ensemble de données lon-
gitudinales inhabituelles et riches sur des enfants suivis pendant quinze ans
pratiquement depuis leur naissance. Cette particularité permet d’étudier em-
piriquement le rôle des circonstances qui varient dans le temps, un problème
qui n’a pas été traité jusqu’à présent dans la littérature sur l’inégalité des
opportunités. Dans ce contexte, est évaluée la sensibilité de la méthodologie
proposée par Niehues et Peichl (2014).
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1 Introduction
Developing countries have experienced substantial increases in enrolment rates and
years of schooling since 1960 (Lee & Lee, 2016). However, there still exists a serious
problem concerning the quality of the educational provision: many pupils learn little
while in school (Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). The vertiginous educational expansion
has been accompanied by increasingly insufficient financial and human resources.
As a consequence, the lack of infrastructure, equipment, and well-trained teachers
–among other factors– became more apparent.
Peru has not been an exception. While the gross primary enrolment ratio was 99%
in 2016 (INEI, 2018), the Student Assessment Census conducted by the Ministry
of Education in the same year showed that only 34% and 46% of second grade
primary students obtain satisfactory results in mathematics and reading tests, re-
spectively (Minedu, 2017). International comparison studies such as the Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA) and the Latin American Laboratory
for Assessment of the Quality of Education (LLECE) depict a similar reality (cf.
OECD, 2016; Unesco, 2015). Certainly, it is worth mentioning that the evidence
provided by both national and international assessments also suggests that there
has been significant progress over the last years. Nevertheless, the indicators are
still far from the expected standards for an upper-middle-income country.
Besides, the Peruvian educational system is considerably inequitable. The recent
literature dealing with this topic has established some stylized facts.1 In particular,
poverty status, parental education, ethnic origins, and rural residence, are vari-
ables that are systematically correlated with both educational inputs (e.g. schools’
characteristics, teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge) and outcomes (e.g. com-
pletion, learning achievement).
Implicitly, previous works claim that the influence of the above-mentioned variables
on educational outcomes of children is unjust. Likewise, previous literature has
generally investigated the importance of those variables independently.
The present work aims to determine comprehensively the extent to which character-
istics that are beyond individual responsibility of children affect their educational
outcomes. In other words, I will address the problem of the distribution of ed-
ucational opportunities. In this sense, relying on the philosophically meaningful
distinction between circumstances and efforts, I will explicitly differentiate between
fair and unfair sources of inequality.2 In the inequality of opportunity (IOp) litera-
ture, circumstances can be seen as those aspects that are beyond individual control
and thus for which individuals should not be held accountable. Genes, sex, and
family background are some examples. On the other side, effort comprises persons’
choices, and therefore individuals are held responsible for. In this context, both
1Recent reviews include Cueto and Felipe (2018), Guadalupe, León, Rodríguez, and Vargas
(2017), Ñopo and Kitmang (2017), and Cueto, Miranda, and Vásquez (2016).
2It is noteworthy that the source of inequality matters from an ethical point of view. Indeed,
most “would agree that effects of circumstances on persons’ well-being that are beyond the control
of individuals should be rectified, while at least some differential outcomes due to choice are not
compensable at the bar of justice” (Roemer & Trannoy, 2015, p.294).
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circumstances and efforts may influence relevant outcomes, such as income or wel-
fare. Equality of opportunity is achieved when circumstances play no role in the
determination of outcome levels (Roemer, 1998).
Analysing the distribution of educational opportunities is a matter of particular
interest because it will shape the future outcomes of children, especially (but not
exclusively) when they enter the labour market. Still, education might not be seen
as an instrumental dimension of well-being, but as a dimension to which every child
has the same right.3
Compared to the existing literature on inequality of opportunity, this document
offers four important contributions. First, it studies educational inequality based on
achievement, that is, educational disparities are addressed by means of standardized
test scores, which are expected to reflect what children have really learned. This
allows “for potentially much greater insight into the determinants of educational
achievement, and might therefore contribute to the design of policies that raise
average learning levels, or that reduce educational disparities” (Ferreira & Gignoux,
2014, p.241). It is noteworthy that in the IOp literature there are very few authors
who analyse this type of inequality in the educational realm, and those who do
so, are mainly concerned with outcomes such as “school completion” or “years of
formal schooling”. These kinds of outcomes do not allow to study the results of the
learning process.
Second, I use a rich longitudinal database on children, which provides a very un-
usual set of “circumstance” variables, practically since the sampled infants were
born. This database also brings the possibility to study the changes over time of
variables that have been taken classically for granted as time-invariant in the IOp
literature, which could potentially appear as a non-negligible mistake. In addition,
it is important to note that the use of panel data has been acknowledged as a
promising path to address the problem of “partial observability of circumstances”4
(Balcázar, 2015), which yields to an unclear extent of underestimation bias for lower
bound IOp measures using cross-sectional data.
Third, I provide both lower and upper bound estimates of educational IOp. Indeed,
thanks to the longitudinal approach, I am able to account for unobserved circum-
stances and apply an adapted version of the upper-bound methodology proposed
by Niehues and Peichl (2014).
Fourth, I tackle the time-varying circumstances problem. Indeed, due to the fact
that the IOp literature has traditionally focused only on one specific stage of life
(typically adulthood), it has been implicitly taken for granted that childhood cir-
cumstances do not vary over time. This is obviously not a problem when considering
innate characteristics such as ethnic origin or sex. Nevertheless, some other cir-
cumstances might be more controversial, such as socioeconomic status background,
nutritional status, or even parental education and occupation. All these variables
3As a matter of fact, the General Education Law No 28044 (2003) states that education is a
fundamental right and a free-cost public service when provided by the state, which ensures the
right for an integral, high-quality, and universal education for every person.
4i.e. the fact that the full set of circumstances is not observed in the data.
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can potentially vary over time. The rich longitudinal database that I use allows
us to explore the impact of this kind of circumstances on IOp measures. Thus, I
evaluate critically the methodology of Niehues and Peichl (2014).
The empirical analysis relies on the Young Lives Study (YLS). This is a multidisci-
plinary longitudinal research programme focusing on childhood poverty, coordinated
by the University of Oxford, and carried out in Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam.
This survey followed two cohorts of children for fifteen years since 2002. In each
country, the sample is composed of approximately 1,000 children from the older co-
hort (born around 1994), and 2,000 children from the younger cohort (born around
2001). Five rounds of data collection have taken place since the first one. For my
purposes, I focus only on the younger cohort because the rich set of circumstances
is observed since they were one year old. In this way, I am able to identify unam-
biguously the evolution of the influence of circumstances over children’s learning
achievement as measured through reading and mathematics tests.
Following Hufe, Peichl, Roemer, and Ungerer (2017), the analysis relies on sets of
circumstances. The sets under consideration include basic individual, household,
and parental characteristics, as well as early childhood conditions, health-related
variables, and shocks. Regarding the effort variables, they are proxied by the child’s
allocation of time: number of hours per day allocated to study at home, and also
to leisure activities.
In order to provide an accurate estimation of the extent of IOp on learning achieve-
ment, I use two complementary methodologies. The first one follows Ferreira and
Gignoux (2011) and serves as a lower bound estimate of IOp. Indeed, it is designed
in such a way that adding new potentially non-observed circumstances can only
increase the share of unjust inequalities. However, since the extent of the under-
estimation of this lower bound is unknown, providing an upper bound estimate
becomes also relevant. Therefore, by exploiting the time-series dimension of the
dataset cited above, I provide an upper bound of IOp, under the key assumption
that circumstances are exogenous and do not vary over time. Using a fixed-effects
model, the method claims that the time-constant individual effect is the maximum
amount of circumstances which an individual should not be responsible for (Niehues
& Peichl, 2014).
Since both methods were conceived to measure IOp on labour market earnings, I
make a slight variation in order to apply them pertinently to the measure of IOp
on standardized test scores. Indeed, unlike the original methods –which use the
mean log deviation (MLD) as inequality index–, I make use of the simple variance
as inequality index, which is the most appropriate choice for studying test scores
constructed from item response theory models (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014). Ad-
ditionally, I do not proceed with the log-linearisation of the dependent variables,
which is a common practice when analysing earnings, but not suitable for standard-
ised test scores.
Finally, since my database permits to trace several circumstances over time, I am
able to evaluate critically Niehues and Peichl (2014)’s upper bound method. As
3
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noted above, this methodology relies heavily on the assumption that circumstances
do not vary over time. For the first time in the literature, this work empirically
tests the importance of this assumption using real data.
The main findings suggest that inequality of opportunity on learning achievement is
a relevant issue for the Peruvian educational system. A set of sixteen circumstances
(coming almost exclusively from the child’s first year of life) account for important
shares of the variance in mathematics and reading tests scores: one-third at age
8, and one-fifth at age 15. Furthermore, the maximum amount of inequality at-
tributable to unfair sources lies around 70%. The results are robust to different
outcomes and inequality measures.
Regarding methodological issues, distinguishing the indirect effects of circumstances
on learning outcomes makes little difference for IOp estimates: the philosophical
debate on compensation approaches for the direct and indirect effects of circum-
stances on the outcome seems to be not a critical concern for practical purposes.
Likewise, the Niehues and Peichl (2014)’s upper bound methodology proved to be
robust to the inclusion of time-varying circumstances. This evidence suggests that
the particular time-varying class of circumstances has a constant impact on the
outcome of interest or, more generally, that the individual-specific effect is the most
important component of learning achievement outcomes.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. First is presented a brief state
of the art (section 2). Then are described the data that is used (section 3) and
the methods for estimating lower and upper bounds of IOp (section 4). After that,
the main results are exposed (section 5) and some robustness checks are conducted
(section 6). Finally, a discussion with concluding remarks and some implications
for public policy are provided (section 7).
2 Related literature
Inequality of opportunity, inspired from the theoretical work of Rawls (1971), ceased
to be a subject of exclusive domain of philosophers thanks to the formalization
works of van de Gaer (1993) and Roemer (1993, 1998).5 Consequently, in the
last decade several studies have been carried out in the field of economics, and
these have given rise to two different approaches to the topic: the ex-ante and the
ex-post perspectives.6 While the former analyses individuals who share the same
circumstances, the latter focuses on individuals who exert the same degree of effort.
Most of the empirical work on inequality of opportunity has focused on the labour
market, taking earnings as the relevant outcome. There are very few authors who
analyse this type of inequality in the educational realm (for developing countries
in general, and Andean countries in particular), and those who do, are mainly
5Some seminal philosophical works are those of Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989), and
Dworkin (1981a, 1981b).
6cf. Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) and Ramos and van de Gaer (2016) for a compelling
discussion.
4
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concerned with outcomes such as ‘school completion’ or ‘years of formal schooling’.
For instance, Yalonetzky (2012) develops two dissimilarity indices to measure IOp,
and applies them to study IOp in Peru, in terms of educational attainment level
(i.e. years of schooling). The author found that IOp on this outcome has reduced
during the last decades, particularly among the younger cohorts.
Some exceptions include the work of Gamboa and Waltenberg (2012), who use a
non-parametric approach inspired by Checchi and Peragine (2010). By exploiting
the PISA 2006-2009 databases to study IOp for educational achievement in six Latin
American countries, they found that IOp accounts for up to 25%, and established
that parental education and school type are important sources of unfair inequality.
Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) study IOp in terms of learning achievement in math-
ematics, reading, and science. They use the 2006 PISA database, which includes
57 countries (but not Peru). Their lower bound methodology showed that IOp
accounts for 35% of all disparities in educational achievement. In addition, they
convincingly argue that the simple variance is the most suitable inequality measure
for analysing standardized test scores. Indeed, unlike other widely used inequality
measures, it is ordinally invariant to standardization.
Regarding the Peruvian educational system, evidence points that traditional school
resources and teacher characteristics are important determinants of student perfor-
mance. Furthermore, despite the fact that the schools are widely spread across the
territory, “they are heterogeneous in terms of physical and human resources avail-
able, such as qualified teachers, school materials, and equipment” (León & Valdivia,
2015, p.83).
Evidence also shows that there is a strong positive association between socioeco-
nomic status at early ages and teacher’s knowledge of content and students. Further-
more, the latter variable is, in turn, positively correlated with pupil’s educational
achievement (Cueto, León, Sorto, & Miranda, 2017).
Likewise, it has been documented that cognitive gaps between advantaged and
disadvantaged children appear early in life, and there are no substantial changes
in this situation once they enter school (Schady et al., 2015). For the urban/rural
case in Peru, Castro and Rolleston (2018) argue that the significant and persistent
cognitive gaps do not reduce over time because the school environment reinforces
them.
3 Data
The empirical analysis of the present work relies on the Young Lives Study (YLS).
This is a multidisciplinary longitudinal research programme focusing on childhood
poverty, coordinated by the University of Oxford, and carried out in Ethiopia,
India, Peru, and Vietnam. This survey followed two cohorts of children for fifteen
years since 2002. In each country, the sample is constituted by approximately 1,000
children from the older cohort (born around 1994), and 2,000 children from the
younger cohort (born around 2001). Five rounds of data collection have taken
5
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place since the first one.7
The sampling strategy used in Peru is described in detail by Escobal et al. (2003). In
broad terms, a hundred households within twenty sentinel sites were chosen using
a multi-stage, cluster-stratified, random sampling approach. It has been shown
that YLS households are very similar to the average household as depicted by other
national-scale surveys. Indeed, the YLS sample “covers the full diversity of children
in Peru in a wide variety of attributes and experiences. Therefore while not suited
for simple monitoring of child outcome indicators, the Young Lives sample will be
an appropriate and valuable instrument for analysing causal relations and modelling
child welfare, and its longitudinal dynamics in Peru” (Escobal & Flores, 2008, p.
iv).8
In the present document, the analysis relies only on the younger cohort because the
rich set of circumstances is observed since they were one year old. In this way, I will
be able to identify unambiguously the evolution of the influence of circumstances
on children’s learning achievement as measured through literacy and mathematics
tests, which are the outcomes of interest.9 It is noteworthy that these tests were
inspired by traditional tests such as Early Grade Reading Assessment, Cloze, and
PISA; they were administered in the preferred language of children, and contained
items of increasing difficulty. Cueto and León (2012) provide a complete description
and analyse their psychometric characteristics for YLS round 3.10
4 Methodology
In order to provide an accurate estimation of the extent of IOp on learning achieve-
ment, I use two complementary methodologies. The first one follows Ferreira and
Gignoux (2011) and serves as a lower bound estimate of IOp. Indeed, it is de-
signed in such a way that adding new potentially unobserved circumstances can
only increase the share of unjust inequalities. However, since the extent of the
underestimation of this lower bound is unknown, providing an upper bound es-
timate becomes also relevant. Therefore, by exploiting the time-series dimension
of the dataset described above, I provide an upper bound of IOp, under the key
assumption that circumstances are exogenous and do not vary over time. Using a
fixed-effects model, the method claims that the time-constant individual effect is the
maximum amount of circumstances which an individual should not be responsible
for (Niehues & Peichl, 2014).
7The surveys were carried out in 2002, 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016. Additionally, there was
a school survey carried out in 2010 for a sub-sample of 572 children from the younger cohort
distributed in 132 primary schools. For more details, cf. Appendix A.
8However, it is noteworthy that the richest five percent of districts were excluded from the
sample with the purpose of over-sampling poor areas. As a consequence, our IOp estimates will
likely be downward biased.
9It is important to mention that in this paper the outcomes are measured as z-values of the
raw scores. Indeed, the Rasch scores are not available for rounds 4 and 5 on the Peruvian sample.
Anyhow, rounds 2 and 3 show that both raw and Rasch scores are strongly correlated (ρ > 0.95).
10Similar technical notes for rounds 4 and 5 are forthcoming.
6
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As a general framework, first let us consider two determinants of an individual
outcome yis (in our case, mathematics and reading tests scores), for individual i
at time point s: (i) circumstances Ci, which are characteristics outside individual
control (e.g. ethnic origin, gender, family background), and hence a source of unjust
inequalities in outcomes; and (ii) effort Eis, which represents all factors affecting
the outcome and that are assumed to be the result of personal responsibility. Hence:
yis = f(Ci, E(Ci)is) (1)
Let then partition the population of individuals i ∈ {1, ...N} into a set of disjunct
types Π = {T1, T2, ...Tk}, i.e. subgroups of the population that are homogeneous
in terms of their circumstances. According to the classic weak definition, perfect
equality of opportunity is achieved if the mean advantage levels µ are identical
across types: µl(y) = µk(y), ∀l, k|Tl, Tk ∈ Π. Measuring IOp thus means capturing
the extent to which µl(y) 6= µk(y), for l 6= k.
The usual procedure consists of computing a measure of IOp by constructing a
hypothetical smoothed distribution µk(y), which is obtained when each individual
outcome yki is replaced by the group-specific mean for each type µk(y). Based on
this smoothed distribution, it can be computed for any scale-invariant inequality
index I11 the absolute IOp level:
θa = I({µki }) (2)
Therefore, the relative share of total inequality that can be attributed to circum-
stances is given by:
θr =
I({µki })
I(y) (3)
4.1 Lower bound
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) proposed a log-linearization of equation (1). For our
purposes, a logarithm on the dependent variable is not pertinent since the outcome
of interest deals with standardized test scores.12 Therefore, the equation writes:
11In fact, the only index that respects the axioms of anonymity, normalization, population
replication, scale invariance, subgroup decomposability, path-independent decomposability, and
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, is the mean log deviation MLD = 1N
∑
i ln
µy
yi
(Foster &
Shneyerov, 2000).
12The log transformation on income or earnings is a common practice since it is usually more
normally distributed than the original variables, which are generally highly right-skewed. On the
contrary, test scores and the normal distributions look usually alike. Moreover, test scores are
typically “constructed from the raw results by means of Item Response Theory (IRT) models,
which attempt to account for “test parameters”, so as to better infer true learning. This pro-
cess generates an arbitrary metric for test scores, which are then typically standardized to some
arbitrary mean and standard deviation” (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014, p.212).
7
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yis = αCi + βEis + uis (4)
The indirect effect of circumstances on the outcome through effort is given by:
Eis = κCi + vis (5)
As noted by Niehues and Peichl (2014), “since it is unlikely that we will observe
all relevant circumstance and effort variables that shape individuals’ outcomes, es-
timating this model will likely yield biased estimates. However, to compute IOp
shares it is not necessary to estimate the structural model and to derive causal rela-
tionships” (p.78). Therefore, by introducing the effort of equation (5) into equation
(4), we obtain the reduced form depicted in equation (7):
yis = (α + βκ)Ci + βvis + uis (6)
yis = ψCi + ηis (7)
Equation (7) can be straightforwardly estimated by OLS. Such a regression will dis-
play the fraction of variance explained by circumstances, including both their direct
and indirect effects on learning achievement as captured by ψˆ. Based on this result,
a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution, where all individuals sharing
the same set of circumstances have the same advantage levels, can be computed as
follows:
µ˜LB = ψˆCKi + σ2/2 (8)
In a situation of equality of opportunity, all predicted outcome levels would be
identical, i.e. there would not be differences in outcomes due to the observed cir-
cumstances CKi . Thus, IOp can be measured as the degree of inequality of these
counterfactual outcome levels, where differences are only due to differences in cir-
cumstances.
This procedure leads to lower-bound estimates because adding another circumstance
variable to the analysis can only increase the explained variation. In other words,
taking into account new previously unobserved circumstances, cannot decrease the
share of inequality due to circumstances. However, in cross-sectional designs, it is
ordinarily the case that not all potential circumstances can be observed. Therefore,
the extent of this underestimation bias is unclear and an upper-bound estimate
becomes relevant.
The lower bound strategy will be implemented using different sets of circumstances.
Table 1 shows the list of circumstance variables that are considered.13 It is worth
noting that almost all of them are from the first round of the database, i.e. when
the child was around one year old.
13In addition, some basic descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix C.
8
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.25
Table 1: Circumstance sets for the lower bound methodology
Circumstance set Variables
Individual Gender, birth order
Geography Area of residence (urban, rural), region (costa, sierra,
selva)
Household Size, dependency ratio
Wealth Household wealth index
Mother Mother’s education, mother’s age at birth, mother
has indigenous tongue
Health Vaccination, stunting
Schooling Attended pre-school, age at start of grade 1, first
attended school was public
Community Population (log)
Note: All variables are from round 1, except “attended pre-school” (round 2), “age at
start of grade 1” (round 4), and “first school attended was public” (round 3). More
details about the variables are provided in table B.1 in the Appendix.
Own elaboration.
4.2 Upper bound
The methodology detailed in section 4.1 yields to lower bounds because of the
impossibility to observe the full set of circumstances. Niehues and Peichl (2014)
–hereafter NP– provide a methodology to estimate upper bounds of IOp under the
assumptions that circumstances are exogenous to the individual and do not vary
over time nor their effects on the outcome of interest. Their approach consists of
two steps: first, “estimate a FE [fixed-effects] model using panel data to derive a
measure of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. Second, (...) use this estimated
unit effect to estimate the maximum extent of inequality which can be attributed
to inequality due to circumstances” (NP, p.79).
NP contemplate two extreme possibilities in order to deal with the potential indirect
effects of circumstances through effort on the outcome variable. The “responsibility
cut” is therefore drawn in step 1 according to two different approaches detailed
below.
In the first approach, there is no compensation for the indirect effects of circum-
stances on the outcome, i.e. they are treated as effort, as suggested by Fleurbaey
(2008). As a consequence, these indirect effects are captured by the β-coefficients
in the following equation:14
yit = βEit + c(1)i + ut + εit (9)
Where Eit are time-variant effort variables, ut captures time-specific effects common
to all individuals, and εit is the random error. All circumstances are accounted for
14Just as in section 4.1, the original logs are omitted for the dependent variable.
9
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by the individual specific unit-effect c(1)i , which is the maximum amount of the effect
attributable to circumstances. It yields unambiguously to an upper bound because
potential non-observed time-invariant effort variables are also captured in this term.
In the second approach, full compensation is granted for the indirect effects of
circumstances on the outcome, i.e. they are also treated as circumstances, in line
with Roemer (1998). Therefore, it is needed to obtain a measure of efforts net
of circumstances, which can be done through the following sequential system of
equations:
yit = ui + ut + εit (10)
Eit = γuˆi + ut + eit (11)
yit = βeˆit + c(2)i + ut + ηit (12)
Eq. (10) calls for a fixed-effects model without any effort variables. The estimation
of the unit effect ui is then used in Eq. (11) “to sterilize all (observed) effort
variables Eit from the impact of all (observed and unobserved) circumstances by
taking out the effect of uˆi” (NP, p.81). In the present work, only two effort variables
Eit are used, namely, the number of hours per day spent studying outside school,
and the number of hours per day spent on leisure activities. Thence, the predicted
residuals of Eq. (11), eˆit, can be seen as the sterilized effort variables. They are
subsequently plugged into Eq. (12) in order to identify the unit effect c(2)i .
Finally, step 2 is the same for both approaches. The unit effect c(k)i , k ∈ {1, 2} is
estimated by the following reduced-form model:
yis = ψcˆ(k)i + vis (13)
The term cˆ(k)i is used “as the maximum extent of inequality which can be attributed
to (time-invariant) circumstances” (NP, p.82). As in section 4.1, a parametric esti-
mate of the smoothed distribution is constructed by replacing individual outcomes
by their predictions. In our case, it would be:
µ˜UB = ψˆcˆ(k)i + σ2/2 (14)
Based on these predicted counterfactual levels, upper bound measures are derived
for equations (2) and (3).
Finally, it is worth noting that since both methods detailed in sections 4.1 and 4.2
were conceived to measure IOp on labour market earnings, I make a slight variation
in order to apply them pertinently to the measurement of IOp on standardized test
10
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scores. Indeed, unlike the original methodologies –which use the mean log devia-
tion (MLD) as inequality index (because it satisfies a number of desired properties,
especially path-independent decomposability)–, I make use of the simple variance
as inequality index. As noted by Ferreira and Gignoux (2014, p.231), “the mean
log deviation is not ordinally invariant in the standardization to which test scores
are submitted” in the context of Item Response Theory (IRT) models. As a conse-
quence, the MLD is not suitable for the present study.
4.3 The role of time-varying circumstances
In order to assess the role of (observed) time-varying circumstances and their impact
on the Niehues and Peichl (2014)’s upper bound method, I proceed as follows.
In the first approach, I add a vector of time-varying circumstances Cit in Eq. (9).
Thus, it becomes:
yit = βEit + λCit + c(1)i + ut + εit (15)
In the second approach, an analogous strategy is pursued:
yit = ui + φCit + ut + εit (16)
Eit = γuˆi + φˆCit + ut + eit (17)
yit = βeˆit + λCit + c(2)i + ut + ηit (18)
Finally, for both approaches a counterfactual for learning achievement is generated
as follows:
yit = ψcˆ(k)i + λCit + vis (19)
µ˜UBT = ψˆcˆ(k)i + λˆCit + σ/2 (20)
The consequent IOp measures are computed in the same way as in the previous
sections. It is worth to mention that this strategy will only be sensitive to observed
time-varying circumstances. Thus, it may only be taken as informative of the
extent to which the NP methodology is robust or not to the inclusion of such sort
of variables. The list of time-varying circumstances that will be tested are detailed
in table 2. Their main descriptive statistics are shown in table C.4 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Time-varying circumstance sets for the upper bound methodology
Circumstance set Variables (time-variant)
Health Stunting, food security
Geography Area of residence (urban, rural), region (costa, sierra,
selva)
Household Size, dependency ratio
Wealth Household wealth index
Schooling School type (public, private), commuting time to
school
Shocks Crime, economic, environmental, family (deaths, ill-
nesses, etc.)
Note: Each variable is observed in rounds 3, 4, and 5. More details about the variables
are provided in table B.2 in the Appendix.
Own elaboration.
5 Results
This section presents first a non-parametric overview of the IOp problem (section
5.1), and then the results of the lower bound procedure (section 5.2), the upper
bound estimation (section 5.3), and the role of time-varying circumstances (section
5.4).
5.1 A non-parametric overview
This subsection is devoted to providing some non-parametric empirical intuitions
concerning the inequality of opportunity problem using the Young Lives database,
before measuring IOp shares in the following subsections.
Figure 1 shows the conditional expectation functions of the child’s score in math-
ematics and reading tests, when she was 15 years old (y-axis) and the household
wealth index when she was 1 year old (x-axis).15 The relationship is eloquent: on
average, the wealthier the household where the child is born in, the better she
performs in mathematics and reading tests fifteen years later.
Let us define types of children (i.e. individuals who share the same circumstances)
based on the following three circumstance variables:16 wealth index tercile in round
1 (3 categories: low, medium, high); mother education (2 categories: primary or
less, more than primary); and first school (2 categories: public, private). The
combination of these three circumstances yields to 12 possible disjunct children
types, as shown in table 3.
Based on this classification, 85% of the sample is contained in five out of the twelve
types (CPU, BPU, BSU, ASI, and ASU). Three types are particularly rare in the
15The details of the wealth index construction and its properties are provided by Briones (2017).
16These circumstances are chosen conveniently for illustrative purposes because they explain
relevant shares of the variance in test scores, as it will be shown in section 5.2.
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Figure 1: Mathematics and Reading tests scores (Round 5) and household wealth
index (Round 1)
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Note: Non-parametric representation of the conditional expectation function with 20 equal-sized
bins (quantiles of the household wealth index in round 1).
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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Table 3: Types of children based on three circumstances: wealth index tercile
(round 1), mother’s education, and child’s first school
Wealth
index
tercile
(R1)
Mother’s
education
First
school
Child
type code
Obs. %
C P I CPI 1 0.1
C P U CPU 506 26.7
C S I CSI 5 0.3
C S U CSU 114 6.0
B P I BPI 12 0.6
B P U BPU 311 16.4
B S I BSI 48 2.5
B S U BSU 260 13.7
A P I API 25 1.3
A P U APU 80 4.2
A S I ASI 208 11.0
A S U ASU 323 17.1
Note: A: High wealth, B: Medium wealth, C: Low wealth, P: Primary or less, S: More than primary,
U: Public, I: Private.
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
population of Peruvian children. They are related to pupils born in medium and
low wealth households attending private schools as first schooling experience (CPI,
CSI, BPI). These three types account for less than 1% of the population. Since
the number of observations in these cases is very poor, these types will be excluded
from the analysis in what follows.
Figure 2 shows the scores in rounds 3 and 5 by type, where the size of each bin is
proportional to the size of the type it represents (cf. table 3). A positive correlation
can immediately be noticed: the types that performed worst in round 3, did also
perform the worst in round 5. This non-parametric representation does not suggest
any pattern of mobility between types. Indeed, a scenario of equal opportunity in
round 5 would display a zero-slope pattern: all types of children would perform
equally on average, i.e. exogenous circumstances would play no role in determining
the outcome. It is worth noting that the two types at the bottom are related to
children born in poor households, whose mother’s education is low (primary at
most), and whose first school is public. On the contrary, the most well placed types
are formed of children born in wealthier households, whose mothers have at least
some secondary education, and usually have started school in a private institution.
14
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Figure 2: Children’s types: Mathematics and Reading tests scores in rounds 3
and 5
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Note: Each bin represents a type, i.e. children who share the same circumstances (cf. table 3 for
details). The size of each bin is proportional to the relative size of each type. Types with less
than 25 observations are omitted.
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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5.2 Lower bound
The illustrative exercise carried out in the previous subsection is interesting for that
it brings some intuitions about the inequality of opportunity problem in a clear
way. However, a non-parametric approach is very data-intensive for estimating IOp
measures. As it has been shown in the schematic definition of types with only
3 circumstances (cf. table 3), some cases end with very few observations and no
consistent estimates can be computed. For this reason, a parametric approach is
prioritized in the present work. In this context, the variables that are going to
be used in what follows are detailed along with their basic descriptive statistics in
appendices B and C.
Tables 4 and 5 implement equation (7) for mathematics and reading tests, respec-
tively, considering the circumstance variables detailed in table 1. Some interesting
relations can be noticed immediately. Having lived in rural areas during the first
year of life (which is a proxy for being born there) has a strong negative and persis-
tent impact on learning outcomes in adolescence. Likewise, having started schooling
in a public institution has an impact in the same direction. In contrast, the level of
wealth that the household had around the child’s first year of life strongly increases
learning achievement at 12 and 15 years. A greater education of the mother also
points in the same direction.
Based on these results, the lower bound estimates of IOp are shown in figure 3. As
one might notice from table 1, almost all the circumstances considered are obtained
from Round 1 (i.e. when the child was around one year old). These circumstances
explain around one-third of total variance in learning achievement when children
are eight years old, and their influence decreases to one-fifth when they are fifteen
years old. This is the case for both mathematics and reading tests. The observed
decreasing influence of the same set of circumstances is not surprising since other
circumstance variables are expected to be more relevant at later ages. In particular,
variables from the educational context such as school and teachers’ characteristics.17
Nevertheless, the fact that circumstances from virtually child’s birth can explain
a substantial part of learning outcomes fifteen years later is a matter of particular
interest for public policy. Especially considering the fact that a sober set of sixteen
circumstance variables taken into account in the analysis does this job (cf. table 1).
It is worth noting that these results are consistent with the findings of Ferreira and
Gignoux (2014), who estimate lower bound IOp shares for some Latin American
countries (but not for Peru, which was not included in the sample). Indeed, based
on the PISA 2006 database, the authors conclude that IOp shares in Brazil, Chile,
and Mexico were around 0.26 for reading and 0.30 for mathematics (Ferreira &
Gignoux, 2014, p.235).
In order to get an idea about the different relative importance of the distinct cir-
cumstance sets, figure 4 shows the decomposition of the share of explained variances
17For instance, using a Peruvian sub-sample of the Young Lives Study, Cueto et al. (2017) found
that “students’ socioeconomic status at age 1 and maternal education were positively associated
with their teachers’ PCK [pedagogical content knowledge] by the time students were enrolled in
fourth grade” (Cueto et al., 2017, p.329).
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Table 4: Mathematics scores in Rounds 3 to 5 and circumstances (OLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Maths R3 Maths R4 Maths R5
Female -0.143∗∗∗ -0.069 -0.214∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.043) (0.042)
Birth order -0.059∗∗ -0.023 -0.027
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Rural (R1) -0.227∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.067) (0.066)
Sierra (R1) -0.047 0.123∗ 0.117∗
(0.055) (0.058) (0.057)
Selva (R1) 0.106 0.098 0.026
(0.068) (0.072) (0.071)
Household size (R1) 0.014 0.007 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Dependency ratio (R1) -0.396∗ -0.243 -0.176
(0.155) (0.165) (0.162)
Wealth index (R1) 0.420∗∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.139) (0.138)
Mother education (R1) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Mother age at birth 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Mother has indig. tongue 0.040 0.047 0.058
(0.056) (0.059) (0.058)
Stunting (R1) -0.081∗ -0.096∗ -0.076∗
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037)
Vaccins (R1) 0.062∗ 0.038 0.007
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Attended pre-school (R2) 0.147∗ 0.092 0.007
(0.062) (0.066) (0.065)
First school public (R3) -0.315∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗ -0.213∗∗
(0.062) (0.065) (0.065)
Age at start of grade 1 -0.417∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗ -0.030
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Com. population log (R1) -0.071∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Constant 2.418∗∗∗ 0.688 0.430
(0.330) (0.351) (0.346)
N 1,638 1,638 1,638
R2 0.328 0.244 0.189
R2-adj. 0.321 0.236 0.180
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Reading scores in Rounds 3 to 5 and circumstances (OLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Read. R3 Read. R4 Read. R5
Female 0.003 0.037 0.010
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044)
Birth order -0.100∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.041
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Rural (R1) -0.403∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.066) (0.069)
Sierra (R1) 0.053 -0.047 0.059
(0.056) (0.058) (0.060)
Selva (R1) 0.245∗∗∗ 0.092 0.111
(0.070) (0.072) (0.074)
Household size (R1) 0.008 0.013 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Dependency ratio (R1) 0.127 -0.213 -0.159
(0.159) (0.163) (0.169)
Wealth index (R1) 0.538∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.320∗
(0.135) (0.138) (0.143)
Mother education (R1) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Mother age at birth 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Mother has indig. tongue -0.153∗∗ 0.008 0.112
(0.057) (0.059) (0.061)
Stunting (R1) -0.083∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.086∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
Vaccins (R1) 0.029 0.025 0.032
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Attended pre-school (R2) 0.234∗∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.071
(0.064) (0.065) (0.068)
First school public (R3) -0.085 -0.180∗∗ -0.204∗∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.067)
Age at start of grade 1 -0.221∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Com. population log (R1) -0.064∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant 0.929∗∗ 0.570 0.747∗
(0.339) (0.347) (0.361)
N 1,638 1,638 1,638
R2 0.301 0.259 0.202
R2-adj. 0.293 0.251 0.193
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 3: Lower bound estimates of inequality of educational opportunity
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Note: Confidence intervals at the 95% level, based on 1,000 replications bootstraps.
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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measured by R-squared in tables 4 and 5 into contributions of groups of circum-
stances by means of the Shapley value (Huettner & Sunder, 2012). Among the
different circumstance sets, the mother’s characteristics are those that account for
the largest share. Likewise, school characteristics and household wealth accounts
for important contributions. In broad terms, the shares are distributed similarly
for rounds 4 and 5, between and within both mathematics and reading tests. How-
ever, in round 3 the share of circumstances corresponding to the mother set is less
sizeable than in later rounds.
5.3 Upper bound
Regarding the upper bound estimation procedure, table 6 shows the first step for
the first approach detailed in section 4.2, where no compensation is granted to the
indirect effects of circumstances on the outcome (cf. Eq. (9)). The two effort vari-
ables under consideration –hours per day spent studying outside school, and hours
per day spent on leisure activities– display the expected signs. Indeed, studying
more hours at home increases the scores in both mathematics and reading tests,
while the opposite relation is observed for spending more time in leisure activities.
Table 6: Mathematics and reading FE estimates: First approach (cf. equation 9)
(1) (2)
Maths Read.
Hours/day studying outside school 0.022 0.043∗∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Hours/day leisure activities -0.020∗∗ -0.007
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.100∗ -0.005
(0.044) (0.049)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
N 4,872 4,872
N_g 1,624 1,624
rho 0.665 0.605
r2_w 0.006 0.004
r2_o 0.004 0.025
r2_b 0.004 0.062
F 4.502 3.134
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The details of the second upper bound approach –where the indirect effects of
circumstances are also treated as circumstances– are depicted in tables 7 and 8 for
mathematics and reading tests, respectively. The procedure consists of a system of
three equations. In both tables, column (1) implements Eq. (10), columns (2) and
(3) implement Eq. (11) for each effort variable, and column (4) does the same for
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Figure 4: Variance decomposition by circumstance sets
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Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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Eq. (12). The specific individual unit effect that results from column (4) is then
used to estimate the maximum extent of IOp.
Table 7: Mathematics FE estimates: Second approach (cf. equations 10, 11, and
12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maths Hours study Hours leisure Maths
Individual effect from col.(1) 0.194∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.025)
Residuals from col.(2) 0.022
(0.012)
Residuals from col.(3) -0.020∗∗
(0.008)
Constant 0.060∗∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗ 4.133∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.023) (0.036) (0.015)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,872 4,872 4,872 4,872
N_g 1,624 1,624
rho 0.665 0.665
r2_w 0.002 0.006
r2_o 0.000 0.001
r2_b . 0.000
F 2.948 83.598 81.185 4.502
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This being said, table 9 summarizes the upper bound IOp estimates following the
two approaches. They are very close and consistent at around 70%. This is the
maximum amount of inequality that can be attributed to circumstances, which are
assumed to be time-invariant. Not surprisingly, the second approach yields higher
values “due to the inclusion of the indirect effects of circumstances on the observed
effort variables” (Niehues & Peichl, 2014, p.87). However, the two special extreme
treatments for the indirect effects of circumstances on efforts make little difference.
This suggests that circumstances and efforts are likely to be, to a large extent,
orthogonal for educational achievement. This result is in line with the findings
of Asadullah, Trannoy, Tubeuf, and Yalonetzky (2018), according to whom the
correlation between overall effort and circumstances is negligible for performance
scores among secondary school pupils in rural Bangladesh.
5.4 Time-varying circumstances and upper bound IOp es-
timates
The impact of the inclusion of time-varying circumstances on the upper bound
estimates is explored in this subsection. All the regressions used for the calculations
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Table 8: Reading FE estimates: Second approach (cf. equations 10, 11, and 12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Read. Hours study Hours leisure Read.
Individual effect from col.(1) 0.212∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.026)
Residuals from col.(2) 0.043∗∗
(0.013)
Residuals from col.(3) -0.007
(0.008)
Constant 0.051∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗ 4.133∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.016) (0.023) (0.036) (0.016)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,872 4,872 4,872 4,872
N_g 1,624 1,624
rho 0.608 0.609
r2_w 0.000 0.004
r2_o 0.000 0.001
r2_b . 0.000
F 0.001 91.999 87.763 3.134
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 9: Upper bound estimates of inequality of educational opportunity
Approach 1 Approach 2
Mathematics 68.55 68.80
[64.13 ; 72.96] [64.34 ; 73.24]
Reading 65.40 66.48
[61.41 ; 69.38] [62.41 ; 70.53]
Note: Confidence intervals at the 95% level in
brackets, based on 1,000 replications bootstraps.
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016.
Own elaboration.
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are presented in Appendix D.
Regarding the first upper bound approach, Table D.1 displays the regression pre-
sented in Eq. (15). Most of the time-varying circumstances do not appear as
statistically significant. Even the two effort variables are not simultaneously signif-
icant for both mathematics and reading tests, despite the fact that they do show
the expected signs. This result probably suggests that the unobserved heterogene-
ity (which includes circumstances such as innate intelligence) is the critical element
when analysing learning achievements. Note that this component is controlled for
in the context of fixed-effects regressions.
This being said, the counterfactuals generated from these regressions yield to IOp
upper bounds of 70.17% and 66.15%, respectively for mathematics and reading
tests, as shown in the first column of table 10. These magnitudes are very close
to those previously calculated without considering time-varying circumstances (cf.
table 9). Actually, they are statistically identical, as the confidence intervals from
both tables put in evidence.
The results of the second IOp upper bound approach including time-varying cir-
cumstances point in the same direction. Indeed, the maximum amount of inequality
is similar to that previously calculated where time-varying circumstances are not
considered. Furthermore, their confidence intervals are virtually the same.
Table 10: Upper bound estimates of inequality of educational opportunity, includ-
ing time-varying circumstances
Approach 1 Approach 2
Mathematics 70.17 70.38
[65.66 ; 74.66] [65.86 ; 74.88]
Reading 66.15 67.30
[62.10 ; 70.18] [63.19 ; 71.39]
Note: Confidence intervals at the 95% level in
brackets, based on 1,000 replications bootstraps.
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016.
Own elaboration.
These findings might suggest that the Niehues and Peichl (2014)’s methodology is
robust to the issue of omitted time-varying circumstances when studying learning
achievement outcomes. After all, it could be the case that this kind of circumstances
has a constant impact on the outcome of interest, and thus it is already captured
through the specific unit effect c(k)i . Nevertheless, at the present stage of research,
this result should be taken with caution since the set of time-varying circumstances
considered here does not appear systematically as statistically significant in the
models.
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6 Robustness checks
For robustness checks, I proceed by using a different outcome first and then using
different inequality measures. Appendix E provides all the material used for the
discussion in this section.
In addition to the mathematics and reading tests, during the Young Lives Study
surveys was also administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT).18 It is
a test of receptive vocabulary ability constituted of 204 items, which is individually
and orally administered, “untimed, and norm-referenced. The task of the test taker
is to select the picture that best represents the meaning of a stimulus word presented
orally by the examiner” (Cueto & León, 2012, p.6).
Certainly, the PPVT is not intended to provide estimates of learning achievement.
However, it is informative of receptive vocabulary ability, which is also a relevant
outcome for individuals during their childhood.
In this context, the OLS estimates of the PPVT scores on circumstances (cf. table
E.1) are remarkably similar to those shown previously in section 5.2 for mathematics
and reading test scores: the set of circumstances under consideration has similar
explanatory power on the variance of the three tests. As a consequence, it is not
surprising that the correspondent lower-bound estimates are also congruent. Indeed,
the lower bound IOp shares for PPVT scores decrease from 35% in round 3 to 24%
in round 5. Both the shares and the sense of the evolution of IOp are alike to the
previous findings. Regarding the upper bound IOp estimates, the counterfactuals
constructed from the results shown in tables E.2 and E.3 yield to IOp shares of
75% at most, for both approaches. These numbers are slightly higher than those
previously found in section 5.3, however, they depict similar conclusions.
Finally, the second robustness check involves the use of different inequality mea-
sures. Although it has been shown that the variance is the most suitable inequality
measure for analysing standardized test scores (cf. Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014), I pro-
vide results using other well-known inequality indices. It is important to mention
that, since the outcomes used in previous sections include zero and negative values,
some inequality indices are not defined because of those ranges. For this reason, I
re-centered the distribution of the test scores in order to have 1 as minimum value.
This being said, table 11 presents the results for the lower bound estimates using the
Gini index and indices from the Generalized Entropy class, with values -1, 0 (mean
logarithmic deviation), 1 (Theil index), and 2 (half the square of the coefficient of
variation). Some regularities are noticed. IOp shares are consistently the highest in
round 3, and the lowest in round 5. This means that the unfair source of inequality
coming from the circumstances under consideration (cf. table 1) decreases over time.
As it was mentioned before, other circumstances might become more relevant as
the child advances in her schooling life. Furthermore, the values of the Generalized
Entropy class’ indices are near to the IOp shares calculated with the simple variance
in section 5.2. This is not the case for the Gini coefficient, which depicts sizeable
18cf. Cueto and León (2012) for more details.
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higher values. The Lorenz curves for mathematics test scores shown in figure E.2
might be useful to understand the issue: the smoothed distribution built from the
circumstances is very close to the original distribution in round 3. It is worthwhile
to mention that the Gini coefficient has some well-known limitations; for instance, it
can give the same value to two different distributions, is most sensitive to inequalities
in the middle portion of the distributions, and it fails to satisfy the diminishing
transfers axiom. Moreover, the Gini coefficient, as well as the Theil indices, are not
ordinally invariant to the standardization of test scores (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2014,
p.242).
Table 11: Lower bound relative shares of IOp: Different inequality measures (cf.
Equation 3)
Gini GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)
Mathematics
Round 3 0.543 0.236 0.265 0.284 0.295
Round 4 0.475 0.157 0.184 0.204 0.218
Round 5 0.380 0.101 0.121 0.133 0.137
Reading
Round 3 0.445 0.148 0.170 0.187 0.198
Round 4 0.485 0.180 0.203 0.218 0.228
Round 5 0.397 0.117 0.133 0.145 0.153
PPVT
Round 3 0.583 0.222 0.263 0.294 0.315
Round 4 0.562 0.238 0.270 0.290 0.301
Round 5 0.481 0.150 0.183 0.204 0.218
Note: GE(a) are inequality indexes from the Generalized Entropy
class for a = -1, 0 (mean logarithmic deviation), 1 (Theil index),
2 (half the square of the coefficient of variation).
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
Regarding the upper bound IOp shares calculated with other inequality measures,
table 12 shows the results of an analogous exercise. Once again, the estimates are
similar to those previously shown in section 5.3. Among the different indices, the
mean value is 0.70, with a range from a minimum of 0.61 and a maximum of 0.85.
The results also put in evidence that the fact of taking into account or not the set
of time-varying circumstances does not make a difference.
7 Concluding remarks
This document explores the problem of inequality of educational opportunity in
Peru for the period 2002-2016 using a unique longitudinal database of children
followed since they were around one year old. It offers, for the first time in the
literature, both lower and upper bounds of IOp for learning achievement using
standardized test scores. In addition, it explores a previously neglected problem:
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Table 12: Upper bound relative shares of IOp: Different inequality measures (cf.
Equation 3)
Gini GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2)
Without time-varying circumstances
First approach
Mathematics 0.85 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.72
Reading 0.82 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.67
Second approach
Mathematics 0.85 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.72
Reading 0.82 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.67
With time-varying circumstances
First approach
Mathematics 0.85 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.72
Reading 0.82 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.68
Second approach
Mathematics 0.85 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.72
Reading 0.82 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68
Note: GE(a) are inequality indexes from the Generalized Entropy
class for a = -1, 0 (mean logarithmic deviation), 1 (Theil index),
2 (half the square of the coefficient of variation).
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
the role of time-varying circumstances.
The methods rely on Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) and Niehues and Peichl (2014).
Certainly, there is a large number of IOp measures that have been proposed in
the literature and it also has been shown that the methodological choice is not
innocuous.19 However, since the objective of the present work was to establish lower
and upper bounds of educational IOp (and not its exact true share) the mentioned
warning does not pose a critical problem.
Furthermore, some authors argue that “all measurable achievement and behaviours
of children, before an age of consent is attained, are the result of their circumstances.
(...) [i.e.] children should not be held responsible for any of their accomplishments
before that age” (Hufe et al., 2017, p.501). According to this view, there is no place
for effort when analysing childhood outcomes. However, there is evidence suggest-
ing that pupil’s overall effort explains a large extent of within-school variations in
test scores, whereas circumstances are more important to explain between-school
variations (Asadullah et al., 2018, pp.4-5). Anyhow, it is worth noting that I used
19According to Ramos and van de Gaer (2017), among the three main measurement criteria –
ex-ante/ex-post, direct/indirect, and parametric/non-parametric– it seems that the former choice
is the most relevant since it substantially influences IOp orderings.
27
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.25
only two effort variables: number of hours allocated to study at home, and to leisure
activities. They seem to be reasonable for this study.20
In this context, the results suggest that circumstances related to the first year of
life account, at least, for one-third of total variance in learning achievement when
children are eight years old, and their influence decreases to, at least, one-fifth
at age fifteen. Likewise, the maximum amount attributable to unjust inequali-
ties lies around 70%. In this context, educational IOp shares are important and
are consistent with the view according to which “breaking the strong association
between socio-economic characteristics, educational opportunities, and educational
outcomes is, perhaps, the main challenge of Peruvian education” (Cueto & Felipe,
2018, p.67, own translation).
Furthermore, the distinction between the two extreme positions of reward principles
for the indirect effect of circumstances on outcomes proved to make little difference.
Likewise, time-varying circumstances seem to be a minor problem when measuring
upper bounds of IOp using panel data. A plausible reason might be that their effect
on the outcome is constant in practice.
For future research, regarding the lower bound procedure, it would be important to
include particular circumstances that are relevant for each stage of the life path, for
example, school and teachers’ characteristics for secondary education. This may be
possible by matching the YLS database with the school census and other surveys
carried out by the Peruvian Ministry of Education.21 On the other hand, more
evidence is needed regarding the impact of time-varying circumstances on upper
bound estimates of IOp. The present work studied this issue for the first time, but
more research in different contexts is needed. Finally, besides the measure of the
extent of IOp, the most promising research path involves the underlying process
and mechanisms that determine IOp, which are still poorly understood, especially
with respect to the effect of preferences and aspirations. Making a link with the
theory of intergenerational mobility could be a promising avenue to fill this gap.
20It may also be noticed that time-varying effort variables are needed in order to compute upper
bounds of IOp within the Niehues and Peichl (2014) framework, otherwise, they would be 100%.
21Unfortunately, I was not given access to the YLS database with the child’s school identifier,
but it does exist.
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Appendices
A The Young Lives Study
Figure A.1: The Young Lives Study
Source: http://younglives.org.uk/content/our-research-methods
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B Variables detail
Table B.1: Circumstance variables used for lower bound estimates
Variable Description Values
taken from
Gender 0 = Male; 1 = Female Round 1
Birth order Order the child is born in his family: 1 = first-born,
2 = second-born, and so on.
Round 1
Area 0 = Urban; 1 = Rural Round 1
Region Dummies for Costa (reference), Sierra, and Selva Round 1
Household size Number of members of the household Round 1
Dependency ratio Ratio of household members aged 0 to 14 and 65 or
more, and those aged 15 to 64
Round 1
Wealth index Ranges from 0 to 1, a higher value indicates a higer
socio-economic status. It is constructed from three
indices: housing quality, access to services, and own-
ership of consumer durables. All the details are pro-
vided in Briones (2017).
Round 1
Mother’s education Continous variable from 0 (none) to 16 (complete un-
dergraduate)
Round 1
Mother’s age at birth Mother’s age at child’s birth Round 1
Mother has indige-
nous tongue
0 = Spanish; 1 = Quechua, Aymara, Nomatsiguenga,
Other native from jungle
Round 1
Stunting Short height for age (z-score): 0 = not stunted (2 sd
or more), 1 = moderately stunted (-3 to -2 sd), 2 =
severly stunted (less than -3 sd)
Round 1
Vaccination Number of vaccines the child received from the follow-
ing list: BCG, Measles, Polio, DPT, HIB, and tetanus
(mother during pregnancy)
Round 1
Attended pre-school Child ever attended pre-school between 3 and 5 years-
old
Round 2
First school public
(proxy)
The school the child attended at 8 years old was public Round 3
Age at start of grade
1
Child’s age at start of grade 1 Round 3
Community’s popu-
lation (log)
Size of the child’s local community in log Round 1
Own elaboration.
33
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.25
Table B.2: Some circumstance variables used for upper bound estimates
Variable Description
Food security Household’s declared food situation in the last 12 months: 1 = "We
always eat enough of what we want", 2 = "We eat enough but not
always what we want"; 3 = "We sometimes do not eat enough"; 4
= "We frequently do not eat enough"
Shock - crime* Destruction/theft of tools for production, housing/consumer
goods; theft of cash, crops, livestock; crime that resulted in
death/disablement
Shock - regulation* Land redistribution, resettlement or forced migration, forced con-
tributions, eviction, invasion of property
Shock - economic* Increase in input prices, decrease in output prices, death of live-
stock, closure place of employment, loss of job / source of income
/ family enterprise, industrial action, contract disputes, disbanding
credit, confiscation of assets, disputes abouth assets, decrease in
food availability
Shock - environ-
ment*
Drought, flooding, erosion, frost, pests on crops/storage/livestock,
crop failure, natural disaster, earthquake, forest fire, pollution
caused by mining
Shock - house* Fire or collapse affecting house/building
Shock - family* Death/illness of a household member, divorce or separation, impris-
onment, discrimination
* Measured as the total number of events.
Note: The values taken of each variable are from rounds 3, 4, and 5.
Own elaboration.
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C Descriptive statistics
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Table C.2: Mathematics scores by circumstances
Score in Mathematics
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Total 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Gender
Male 0.069 0.988 0.027 1.004 0.103 1.040
Female -0.069 1.008 -0.028 0.996 -0.105 0.946
Area (R1)
Urban 0.238 0.915 0.226 0.906 0.184 0.991
Rural -0.504 0.985 -0.500 1.018 -0.394 0.901
Region (R1)
Costa 0.331 0.873 0.221 0.902 0.161 0.994
Sierra -0.202 1.033 -0.113 1.055 -0.066 1.018
Selva -0.063 0.966 -0.130 0.941 -0.150 0.903
Mother’s tonge
Spanish 0.173 0.952 0.148 0.936 0.111 0.980
Indigenous -0.399 1.001 -0.356 1.062 -0.255 0.989
Stunting (R1)
Not stunted 0.129 0.960 0.130 0.959 0.117 0.990
Moderately stunted -0.238 1.025 -0.277 1.008 -0.212 0.960
Severly stunted -0.504 0.975 -0.452 1.066 -0.474 0.967
Attended pre-school (R2)
No pre-school -0.551 0.962 -0.434 1.009 -0.354 0.961
Pre-school 0.103 0.975 0.078 0.978 0.067 0.988
First school (R3)
Private 0.716 0.797 0.561 0.816 0.544 1.030
Public -0.129 0.974 -0.105 0.998 -0.092 0.947
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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Table C.3: Reading scores by circumstances
Score in Reading
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Total 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Gender
Male 0.006 0.977 -0.017 0.982 0.002 1.010
Female -0.007 1.023 0.018 1.018 -0.002 0.990
Area (R1)
Urban 0.281 0.857 0.228 0.915 0.203 0.922
Rural -0.596 1.021 -0.503 0.997 -0.452 1.020
Region (R1)
Costa 0.316 0.813 0.310 0.907 0.205 0.928
Sierra -0.221 1.076 -0.193 1.005 -0.121 1.029
Selva 0.029 0.927 -0.067 1.014 -0.074 0.988
Mother’s tonge
Spanish 0.219 0.888 0.178 0.949 0.129 0.934
Indigenous -0.505 1.060 -0.420 1.006 -0.310 1.089
Stunting (R1)
Not stunted 0.139 0.956 0.151 0.948 0.115 0.962
Moderately stunted -0.226 0.997 -0.317 1.043 -0.238 1.053
Severly stunted -0.641 1.015 -0.522 0.979 -0.425 0.991
Attended pre-school (R2)
No pre-school -0.572 0.990 -0.463 1.044 -0.385 1.039
Pre-school 0.106 0.965 0.085 0.971 0.067 0.978
First school (R3)
Private 0.564 0.702 0.613 0.787 0.543 0.809
Public -0.102 1.011 -0.113 0.994 -0.107 1.000
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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Table C.4: Panel time-varying circumstances: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Stunting
overall 0.22 0.49 0.00 2.00
between 0.43 0.00 2.00
within 0.24 -1.11 1.55
Food security
overall 1.75 0.66 1.00 4.00
between 0.49 1.00 4.00
within 0.46 -0.25 3.75
Rural
overall 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
between 0.43 0.00 1.00
within 0.13 -0.40 0.94
Sierra
overall 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
between 0.48 0.00 1.00
within 0.13 -0.22 1.11
Selva
overall 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
between 0.36 0.00 1.00
within 0.08 -0.51 0.83
Household size
overall 5.30 1.87 2.00 18.00
between 1.60 2.00 14.33
within 0.98 -0.70 12.30
Dependency ratio
overall 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.75
between 0.15 0.00 0.70
within 0.09 -0.17 0.62
Household wealth index
overall 0.59 0.20 0.00 0.95
between 0.18 0.03 0.94
within 0.08 0.17 1.03
Public school
overall 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
between 0.33 0.00 1.00
within 0.18 0.16 1.49
Commuting time to school
overall 15.12 16.35 0.00 420.00
between 11.63 0.67 150.00
within 11.76 -119.88 285.12
Shock: crime
overall 0.16 0.44 0.00 4.00
Continues on next page...
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Table C.4 – ...Continued from previous page
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
between 0.28 0.00 2.00
within 0.35 -1.50 2.50
Shock: regulation
overall 0.01 0.09 0.00 2.00
between 0.05 0.00 0.67
within 0.07 -0.66 1.34
Shock: economic
overall 0.19 0.48 0.00 5.00
between 0.30 0.00 2.00
within 0.38 -1.81 3.53
Shock: environment
overall 0.42 0.90 0.00 7.00
between 0.67 0.00 4.67
within 0.61 -3.25 4.42
Shock: house
overall 0.01 0.17 0.00 2.00
between 0.09 0.00 1.00
within 0.14 -0.99 1.35
Shock: family
overall 0.42 0.66 0.00 4.00
between 0.42 0.00 2.00
within 0.52 -1.58 3.08
Source: Young Lives Study, 2002-2016 - Rounds 3, 4, and 5.
Own elaboration.
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D Regressions for the analysis of time-varying
circumstances
D.1 Upper bound first approach
Table D.1: Mathematics and reading FE estimates including time-varying circum-
stances: First approach (cf. equation 15)
(1) (2)
Mathematics Reading
Hours/day studying outside school 0.020 0.044∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Hours/day leisure activities -0.019∗ -0.005
(0.008) (0.008)
Stunting -0.035 -0.050
(0.036) (0.040)
Food security 0.035 0.005
(0.018) (0.020)
Rural -0.087 -0.176∗
(0.073) (0.081)
Sierra -0.240∗∗∗ -0.149
(0.071) (0.079)
Selva 0.095 -0.053
(0.114) (0.128)
Household size 0.010 -0.008
(0.009) (0.010)
Dependency ratio -0.410∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.094) (0.105)
Wealth index 0.015 -0.049
(0.117) (0.130)
Public school -0.018 0.015
(0.046) (0.052)
Commuting time to school 0.001 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Shock: crime 0.013 -0.065∗
(0.024) (0.027)
Shock: regulation -0.093 -0.124
(0.110) (0.123)
Shock: economic 0.011 0.049∗
(0.022) (0.025)
Shock: environment 0.006 -0.022
(0.014) (0.016)
Shock: house 0.055 0.037
(0.060) (0.067)
Shock: family 0.019 -0.044∗
(0.017) (0.018)
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Constant 0.196 0.163
(0.117) (0.131)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
N 4,872 4,872
N_g 1,624 1,624
rho 0.656 0.580
r2_w 0.021 0.015
r2_o 0.046 0.130
r2_b 0.055 0.195
F 3.516 2.505
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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D.2 Upper bound second approach
Table D.2: Mathematics FE estimates including time-varying circumstances: Sec-
ond approach (cf. equations 16, 17, and 18)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maths Hours study Hours leisure Maths
Stunting -0.034 -0.034
(0.036) (0.036)
Food security 0.036∗ 0.035
(0.018) (0.018)
Rural -0.082 -0.085
(0.073) (0.073)
Sierra -0.244∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.071)
Selva 0.086 0.094
(0.115) (0.114)
Household size 0.009 0.010
(0.009) (0.009)
Dependency ratio -0.409∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.094)
Wealth index 0.037 0.015
(0.117) (0.117)
Public school -0.024 -0.018
(0.046) (0.046)
Commuting time to school 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Shock: crime 0.016 0.013
(0.024) (0.024)
Shock: regulation -0.097 -0.091
(0.110) (0.110)
Shock: economic 0.009 0.011
(0.022) (0.022)
Shock: environment 0.007 0.006
(0.014) (0.014)
Shock: house 0.056 0.054
(0.060) (0.060)
Shock: family 0.018 0.019
(0.017) (0.017)
Individual effect from col.(1) 0.172∗∗∗ 0.047
(0.016) (0.026)
Time-varying circumstances prediction 0.613∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.119)
Residuals from col.(2) 0.020
(0.012)
Residuals from col.(3) -0.019∗
(0.008)
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Constant 0.154 1.958∗∗∗ 4.269∗∗∗ 0.154
(0.109) (0.024) (0.037) (0.109)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,872 4,872 4,872 4,872
N_g 1,624 1,624
rho 0.655 0.657
r2_w 0.018 0.021
r2_o 0.045 0.042
r2_b 0.055 0.049
F 3.275 71.517 94.452 3.516
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D.3: Reading FE estimates including time-varying circumstances: Second
approach (cf. equations 16, 17, and 18)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Read. Hours study Hours leisure Read.
Stunting -0.049 -0.051
(0.040) (0.040)
Food security 0.005 0.005
(0.020) (0.020)
Rural -0.173∗ -0.180∗
(0.081) (0.081)
Sierra -0.154 -0.152
(0.079) (0.079)
Selva -0.057 -0.054
(0.128) (0.128)
Household size -0.010 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010)
Dependency ratio 0.046 0.049
(0.105) (0.105)
Wealth index -0.027 -0.050
(0.130) (0.130)
Public school 0.010 0.015
(0.052) (0.052)
Commuting time to school 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Shock: crime -0.062∗ -0.066∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Shock: regulation -0.139 -0.127
(0.123) (0.123)
Shock: economic 0.043 0.050∗
(0.025) (0.025)
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Shock: environment -0.022 -0.023
(0.016) (0.016)
Shock: house 0.037 0.038
(0.067) (0.067)
Shock: family -0.044∗ -0.045∗
(0.018) (0.019)
Individual effect from col.(1) 0.172∗∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.018) (0.028)
Time-varying circumstances prediction 0.716∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.152)
Residuals from col.(2) 0.044∗∗∗
(0.013)
Residuals from col.(3) -0.005
(0.008)
Constant 0.231 2.030∗∗∗ 4.378∗∗∗ 0.229
(0.121) (0.028) (0.045) (0.121)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,872 4,872 4,872 4,872
N_g 1,624 1,624
rho 0.581 0.583
r2_w 0.011 0.015
r2_o 0.121 0.111
r2_b 0.180 0.164
F 2.068 76.257 82.393 2.505
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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E Robustness checks material
Table E.1: PPVT z-scores in Rounds 3 to 5 and circumstances (OLS estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
PPVT R3 PPVT R4 PPVT R5
Female -0.079∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.041) (0.043)
Birth order -0.067∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Rural (R1) -0.271∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗ -0.152∗
(0.062) (0.067) (0.070)
Sierra (R1) 0.013 0.041 0.104
(0.050) (0.054) (0.056)
Selva (R1) 0.083 0.060 0.119
(0.063) (0.068) (0.070)
Household size (R1) 0.006 -0.003 -0.000
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Dependency ratio (R1) 0.020 0.013 -0.012
(0.146) (0.158) (0.164)
Wealth index (R1) 0.844∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.130) (0.135)
Mother education (R1) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Mother age at birth 0.013∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Mother has indig. tongue 0.021 0.060 0.034
(0.053) (0.057) (0.059)
Stunting (R1) -0.120∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.070
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041)
Vaccins (R1) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.065∗
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
Attended pre-school (R2) 0.124∗ 0.143∗ 0.187∗∗
(0.063) (0.068) (0.071)
First school public (R3) -0.213∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.060) (0.062)
Age at start of grade 1 -0.210∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.037) (0.040) (0.042)
Com. population log (R1) -0.049∗ -0.044 -0.053∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Constant 0.698∗ 0.198 0.365
(0.322) (0.349) (0.361)
N 1,401 1,401 1,401
R2 0.355 0.315 0.241
R2-adj. 0.347 0.307 0.231
Standard errors in parentheses
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Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table E.2: PPVT FE estimates: First approach (cf. equation 9)
(1)
PPVT
Hours/day studying outside school -0.005
(0.011)
Hours/day leisure activities -0.016∗
(0.007)
Constant 0.121∗∗
(0.041)
Time fixed effects Yes
N 4,773
N_g 1,591
rho 0.720
r2_w 0.002
r2_o 0.012
r2_b 0.056
F 1.601
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table E.3: PPVT FE estimates: Second approach (cf. equations 10, 11, and 12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPVT Hours study Hours leisure PPVT
Individual effect from col.(1) 0.235∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.025)
Residuals from col.(2) -0.005
(0.011)
Residuals from col.(3) -0.016∗
(0.007)
Constant 0.045∗∗∗ 1.899∗∗∗ 4.133∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.023) (0.037) (0.014)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,773 4,773 4,773 4,773
N_g 1,591 1,591
rho 0.718 0.718
r2_w 0.000 0.002
r2_o 0.000 0.000
r2_b . 0.000
F 0.466 114.219 88.023 1.601
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure E.1: PPVT: Lower bound estimates of inequality of educational opportu-
nity
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Note: Confidence intervals at the 95% level, based on 1,000 replications bootstraps.
Source: Young Lives Study 2002-2016. Own elaboration.
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Figure E.2: Lorenz curves for mathematics test scores
(a) Matematics Round 3
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(b) Matematics Round 5
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